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I. Tax treaty law and domestic law 
In accordance with Art. 96 (1) of the Spanish ConstiMion of 1978 (hereafter 
'CE') and Art. 1 (5) of the Civil Code (hereafter 'CC'), international treaties 
in general - and tax treaties in particular - become part of domestic law once 
they have been published in the Boletfn Oficial del Estado (Spanish Official 
Bulletin, hereafter 'BOE'). In this respect, although the Spanish Government 
is free to decide whether to negotiate a tax treaty with another country, the 
convention may not be signed without prior approval from the parliament. 
Thus, only tax treaties validly concluded, ratified by the contracting patties 
(after parliamentary approval, if required) and finally published in the BOE 
are part of Spanish law. Generally speaking, the date of publication of the agree-
ment is when it enters into force in Spain. 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed o.ut that the application of Art. 94 (1) (d) 
CE to tax conventions, which provides that treaties creating financial obliga-
tions for the Spanish Treasury or affecting domestic legislation (such as tax 
treaties) must be approved by the parliament, is still largely discussed nowa-
days. From the author's point of view, however, the fact that tax treaties must 
be subject to the approval of the parliament is not a controversial question. 
Concerning the status of tax treaties in relation to domestic law, the principle 
of the primacy of treaty law over national law applies to tax matters as to any 
other legal matters. In other words, tax treaties are overruled by the CE but in 
turn overrule the internal tax acts promulgated by the Spanish legislator. 1 
This remark implies that, obviously, treaty provisions would be applied in case 
divergent regulations arose from domestic law and international agreements. 
Needless to say, the possibility of a "treaty override" by the domestic legisla-
tion exists but in case that such a situation occurs an amendment of the internal 
act concerned will undoubtedly be necessary in order to clarify its meaning 
to the tax treaty obligation in force. As noted above, the contracting States 
are unable to give preference to their own domestic law (which would mean a 
treaty tax violation2) unless the tax treaty itself or a general rule of International 
law enables them to do that. 
Although not being expressly stated, this conclusion clearly emerges -a sensu contrario -
from the wording of Art. 96 (I) CE, which states that international tax treaties can 
only be modified or derogated according to their provisions or to the general rules of 
international law. 
Once an international agreement is incorporated into domestic law, the agreement still 
remains as an international treaty. The subsequent enactment of domestic legislation 
which is intended to override a treaty is therefore a breach of this international obliga-
tion. The overriding of a treaty provision by internal law could lead to a complaint under 
the mutual agreement procedure of the treaty or before an international arbitral body 
such as the International Court of Justice, or to the termination of the treaty by the other 
party. 
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Besides, it should be emphasized that the way the tax treaty is implemented 
into domestic law does not have any impact on the interpretation of tax treaties, 
taking into account that this issue is governed by customary International 
law, as embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 
1969 (hereafter 'VCLT')3 and by the specific interpretation provision that al-
most all the double taxation conventions include. 
II. The relevance of Community law for the interpretation of 
tax treaty law 
Community law has been part of Spanish law since 1 January 1986 and pre-
vails over national law.4 Its supremacy is based on its higher legal status. In 
broad lines, the treaties establishing the European Community make few refer-
ences to direct taxation, apart from Art. 220 EC Treaty, but there are several 
principles and fundamental freedoms which may have an impact on tax trea-
ties signed by Member States (free movement of workers, freedom of estab-
lishment, freedom to provide services and free movement of capital, the gener-
al non-discrimination clause and the most-favoured-nation treatment). 
Potential conflicts are inherent in the parallel application of the two treaty sys-
tems.5 As far as treaty interpretation is concerned, two areas of possible con-
flict arise: firstly, conflicts between double taxation conventions and overlap-
ping Community legislation and, secondly, conflicts between tax treaties and 
the principles and fundamental freedoms of the Community previously men-
tioned. In this conflict between the two rules, Community law has priority. 
An interesting example as regards this issue is the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.6 
In relation to Art. 24, this provision supplements non-discrimination rules 
and equal treatment precepts already existing under international or domestic 
law. For EU Member States the rule prohibiting discrimination in tax matters 
is settled by Art. 6 EC Treaty (Art. 12 of the Treaty of Amsterdam) and con-
cretely defined in Articles 48 (Art. 39 Treaty of Amsterdam), 52 (Art. 43 
Treaty of Amsterdam) and 59 (Art. 49 Treaty of Amsterdam) of the EC Treaty. 
The content of this rule has been clearly stated through the case law of the 
European Court of Justice. Art. 24 of the Model Treaty designed by the Organisa-
Articles 26 (pacta sunt servanda) and 27 (internal law and observance of treaties) of 
the VCLT provide clear rules on the performance of treaties. 
See Art. 93 CE and Art. 191 Treaty of Rome of 1957. 
See Hinnekens, Compatibility of bilateral tax treaties with European Community 
Law. The rules, EC-Tax Review No.4/1994, p 146. 
This Directive (Council Directive 90/435 of 23 July 1990) provides, inter alia, for ex-
emption from withholding tax on dividends paid from a subsidiary in one Member 
State to a parent owning 25 per cent or more of the share capital in another Member 
State; the question therefore arises whether this Directive overrides bilateral treaties. 
Baker, Double taxation conventions and International Tax Law (1994), p 59. 
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tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereafter 'OECD Model') 
prohibits a less favourable treatment whilst the non-discrimination rule of the 
EC Treaty constitutes a provision that protects against discrimination based 
on nationality.? 
HI. The relevance of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the law of treaties 
Tax treaties are international agreements, thus, Articles 31 to 33 VCLT are in 
principle applicable in order to determine their interpretation. This Convention, 
which entered into force on 27 January 1980, embodies a system of provi-
sions which are directly binding in Spain due to the ratification of the VCLT 
by the Spanish parliament on 2 May 1972 (BOE 13 June 1980). In addition, 
it should be borne in mind that even though Spain did not ratify the VCLT, its 
rules would also be applied as they are part of customary International Law. 
The Spanish practice reflects, however, that whereas both the Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Court have usually noted the relevance of the VCLT 
(whose regulations have been more often than not forgotten by the Courts8), 
the authors, on the contrary, do not know of any case in which the VCLT has 
been explicitly applied to the interpretation of tax treaties. 
Consequently, we can conclude that despite their theoretical application to 
tax treaties, the general principles of interpretation of the VCLT are not of a great 
influence in Spain.9 The Commentaries on the OECD Model, for example, 
do not have an appropriate characterization in the VCLT. Logically, since tax 
treaties are simply a specific kind of international agreements, the general provi-
sions of the VCLT are not enough to rule accurately the status of such an 
important tool for the interpretation of double taxation conventions. 
Moreover, some Spanish authors have also indicated the strict extent the VCLT 
gives to the term "context" - apart from the little attention paid to this expres-
sion by the Vienna Convention - as well as the restrictive conditions required 
in order to use the complementary materials related to the tax treaty by the 
Vogel, K/aus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions3 (1997) (hereafter 'Conventions') 
p 1282. It should be kept in mind, however, the extension operated in this ambit, in 
relation to taxes, by the Schumacker Case (ECJ 14 February 1995, Finanzamt Kiiln-
Altsdatd contra Roland Schumacker, Case 279/93, Recueil at 1-225). 
National Courts have generally been applying the internal rule of interpretation (Art. (1) 
CC) instead of the provisions of the VCL T to clarify the meaning of tax treaty terms. 
Indeed, even some rulings of the Supreme Court - although not concerning tax trea-
ties - for instance, of 20 and 21 January 1992, followed that philosophy that, fortu-
nately, does not constitute the general rule at present. See, for example, the sentence of 
the Constitutional Court of 28 September 1995, in which this judicial authority insists 
on the application of the VCLT in the interpretation of international treaties. 
Calder6n Carrero/Pifia Garrido, Interpretation of tax treaties, ET 1999, p 380. 
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interpreter. 10 As Casero Barr6n argues, we consider that all materials which 
can be useful to the interpretation objective must be used in order to clarify as 
much as possible the meaning of a tax treaty term. Notwithstanding, the pre-
vious suggestion involves the problem of the weight that has to be given to each 
of the materials mentioned as any solution is provided by the VCLT to this 
question. 
To make matters worse, statistics show that the competent authorities of the 
contracting States usually apply the international principles of interpretation 
codified in the VCLT with different intensity. Then, taking Articles 31 to 33 
VCLT as the starting point, in comparison with several States that follow an 
objective or a subjective approach, others focus the importance on the text it-
self, whereby the final result is an unequal valoration of the elements taken 
into consideration. The last remark brings us back to the criteria used by the 
Spanish interpreter in relation to double taxation conventions. At first glance, 
they are not identical to the ones included in the VCLT but most of them are 
quite similar to the rules provided by Articles 31 to 33, as it will be commented 
below in more detail. 
On the whole, this shows that the internal principles used in the interpretation 
of international agreements do not differ so much from the international rules 
included in the VCLT. 11 In any case, it is convenient to note that when referring 
to domestic principles of interpretation in this context, we do not comprise 
the criteria contained in Articles 1281 to 1289 CC (which govern the interpre-
tation of private contracts), but only the ones settled in Art. 3 (1) CC12 that, as it 
was previously indicated, have much in common with the VCLT rules. 
10 Casero Barr6n, La interpretaci6n en Derecho espafiol de Ios tratados internacionales 
para evitar la doble imposici6n. El papel del Consejo de Estado. Propuesta revitalizante 
o regeneracionista (1), Carta Tributaria 1988, p 5. In the opinion of this tax author, 
that situation shows the inappropiate character of the VCLT with regard to tax treaty 
interpretation. 
11 See, as examples of the application of Articles 31 to 33 VCL T to non-tax treaties, the 
case of the territorial conflict between the Jamahiriya Arabe Libia and Chad. CIJ, 
Recueil 1994, at 6. In this case the context (Art. 31 (2) VCLT) is represented by the Good 
Neighbourhood Convention between France and Libia of 1955. The International 
Court of Justice affirmed that the conclusions reached by the Court were reinforced by 
the treaty context and particularly by the aforesaid Convention, which had been signed 
at the same time as the treaty in question. Case of the frontier controversy terrestrial, 
insular and maritime. CIJ, Recuei/1992, at 584. Recourse to the complementary ways 
of interpretation (Art. 32 VCL T) plays an important role in this connection. And, in 
relation to tax treaties a good example regarding Art. 31 (2) (b) VCLT could be, for 
instance, that Spain produces a technical explanation for its tax treaty with Canada 
and this country publicly announces later its acceptance of the Spanish explanation of 
the Spain-Canada tax treaty. See in this respect Fermindez de Casadevante Romani, 
La interpretaci6n de las normas internacionales (1996). 
12 The purport of Art. 3 (I) CC, as the legal basis of domestic interpretation, states that the 
law must be interpreted according to the proper meaning of the words, in relation to the 
context, the historical and legal antecedents, the social circumstances present at the mo-
ment of its application, and particularly taking into account the goal of the provisions. 
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IV. The relevance of the OECD Model and the OECD 
Commentary 
Among the several model conventions for the avoidance of international 
double taxation existing so far, the OECD Model is the most extended as it is 
followed not only by Member States in their bilateral negotiations but also by 
non-Member States, as well as in the work of some worldwide or regional inter-
national organisations in this field. Indeed, both the United Nations Model 13 and 
the United States Model Treaty 14 use the OECD Model as a basic instrument 
of reference, which reflects its great importance. As recommended by the 
Council of the OECD, 15 when concluding or revising bilateral conventions, 
"member countries should conform to this Model Convention as interpreted 
by the Commentaries thereon and having regard to the reservations contained 
therein and their tax authorities should follow these Commentaries, as modified 
from time to time and subject to their observations thereon when applying and 
interpreting the provisions of their bilateral tax conventions that are based on 
the Model Convention". 16 
The existence of the OECD Model has facilitated bilateral negotiations and 
allowed desirable harmonization in this field. The majority of the double taxa-
tion conventions concluded by Spain follow the pattern and, in most cases, 
the main provisions of the OECD Model. 
As a consequence of the OECD Model's impact, the Commentaries on its provi-
sions have become a widely accepted guide to the interpretation and appli-
cation of the articles of such bilateral treaties. Nevertheless, some important 
questions still remain unresolved. First, it is necessary to precise the real status 
of the Commentaries for the purpose of treaty interpretation. Then, the under-
lying question is: could we consider the Commentaries to be included in the term 
"context" used in Art. 31 (2) VCLT or in the so-called "preparatory work" 
within the meaning of Art. 32 VCLT? Whereas the Spanish tax authorities 
and courts do not refer to the nature, legal force and rank of the OECD Commen-
taries, a different thesis can be found in the Spanish literature on this subject. 
In our opinion, although the first would surely be the best solution, it is, how-
ever, truly difficult to integrate the Commentaries into the strict definition of 
"context" given by Art. 31 (2) VCLT. Obviously, the OECD Commentaries 
13 United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries (United Nations Publications 1980, New York). It also reproduces a signifi~ 
cant part of the Commentaries of the OECD Model Convention. 
14 United States Model Income Tax Treaty of 1981. 
15 See OECD Council Recommendation of 30 July 1963; Recommendation of 11 April 
1977; Recommendation of 1 September 1992; Recommendation of 21 September 
1995. 
16 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Introduction, at 7; 29 April 
2000 (condensed version), OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Paris. 
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do not constitute an agreement or an instrument made by the contracting States, 
in connection with the conclusion of each double taxation convention, as it is 
required by the aforesaid article. On the contrary, the general character of the 
Commentary as a widely accepted guide in the interpretation of tax treaties 
does not allow that identification. Consequently, only in the case we have in 
mind, the content of Articles 31 (2) and (3) is not a numerus clausus, it could 
be possible to include the OECD Commentaries in the treaty "context" defined 
by the VCLT. An additional reason to reject this approach focuses on the first 
sentence of Art. 31 (1) VCLT, which would imply the binding effect of the 
Commentaries for the purpose of treaty interpretation whether they became 
part of the "context". The absence of such a binding character - which was 
expressly declared by the Committee in the Model's introduction - makes 
this solution impossible. 17 
On the other hand, if we consider the OECD Commentaries as a supplemen-
tary means of interpretation, as a second group of Spanish scholars does 18 -
after having pointed out the non-restricting wording of Art. 32 VCLT -, their 
interpretative value will be only complementary and consequently limited. 
Therefore, although this provision is, undoubtedly, the unique article which we 
believe could provide some room for the Commentaries, it seems to us that 
this secondary value of the Commentaries does not correspond to the intention 
of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs. Other scholars hold that the Commentaries 
could be understood within the meaning of Art. 31 (3) (c) VCLT, as the relevant 
rules of International law applicable in the relations between the parties. 19 
17 Nevertheless, we agree with those commentators (Tovillas Mon:in, for example) who 
consider the OECD Commentaries as a part of the "context" under Art. 3 (2) OECD MC, 
because of the wider sense that this general rule attributes to the term "context" in 
comparison to the VCLT. In our view, this thesis becomes stronger after the definition 
of "context" provided by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs in Paragraph 12 of the 
OECD Commentaries to Art. 3 (2). Opposing this position is Baena Aguilar, Editorial, 
Revista de Derecho Financiero y Hacienda Ptiblica No. 242, 1996, pp 895 and 897. 
18 See Bornis, Los convenios internacionales para evitar la doble imposici6n desde el 
punto de vista de la teorfa general de Ios tratados internacionales, in: Instituto de Estu-
dios Fiscales (ed), Estudios de doble imposici6n internacional (1979), p 36; Baena 
Aguilar, Revista de derecho Financiero y Hacienda Ptlblica, p 895; Tovillas Monin, 
La interpretaci6n de Ios Convenios de doble imposici6n y la chiusula general de inter-
pretaci6n del Modelo de Convenio de la OCDE, Revista Latinoamericana de Derecho 
Tributario 1996, p 113. 
19 In this respect, there is also a group of authors who understand both the new Model 
Convention and Commentaries on it as a "subsequent practice", within the meaning of 
Art. 31 (3) (b) VCLT, of the States that take part in it. See, among others, de Juan 
Pefialosa, Modelo 92, Impuestos No.15-16, 1993, p 31. On the contrary, we agree 
with Lang in that the OECD Model and Commentary ,can equally not be seen as 
"subsequent practice" as Art. 31 (3) (b) of the Vienna Convention specifies.( ... ) there 
has to be a differentation between treaty interpretation as set out in Art. 31 (3) (b) of 
the Vienna Convention and treaty amendments". Lang, Later Commentaries of the 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, not to affect the interpretation of previously con-
cluded tax treaties, Intertax 1997, p 8. 
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We do not agree with that opinion to the extent that, strictly speaking, the 
Commentaries, not being binding, can not be considered real rules of Interna-
tional law. 
After carefully studying the various solutions noted above, we think the OECD 
Commentaries constitute a major source of interpretation20 that should be in-
cluded in the "context" of each tax treaty. On this basis, our suggestion would 
be to slightly modify the VCLT by adding this specific tool of tax treaty interpre-
tation not contained in it because of the general character of the VCLT. The 
relevance of this interpretative instrument does not allow to identify it with the 
"preparatory work" - which corresponds to a minor level - and with its comple-
mentary effects.21 
Another interesting question regarding the OECD Commentaries was the 
possibility to apply them in the interpretation of earlier tax treaties. The OECD 
Committee made clear this controve.rsy between the authors by recommend-
ing that all tax treaties, including those entered into before the revisions of 
the Commentaries, be interpreted in the light of the updated Commentaries. 
Thus, the ambulatory or dynamic theory is adopted against the static one. In 
Spain, both the Tribunal econ6mico-administrativo central22 (hereafter 'TEAC') 
and the Direcci6n General de Tributos (hereafter 'DOT') have been using the 
OECD Model and the Commentaries as general criteria in the interpretation 
of tax treaties. Only when the wording of the treaty provision is very clear no 
reference is made to the OECD Commentary. Eventually, it is possible to affirm 
that the Spanish tax rulings and court decisions often refer to the OECD 
Commentaries and reports,23 which sometimes intend to solve the doubts arising 
in the interpretation of tax treaties or reinforce the meaning reached by using 
other methods,24 or provide the characterization of income and transactions 
or determine whether a permanent establishment exists. Moreover, in Spain 
the OECD Commentary and reports have been used for the interpretation of 
20 The OECD Commentary provides not only aids to treaty interpretation, but also in-
cludes suggestions, guidelines and analysis concerning a wide variety of double taxa-
tion issues and problems. Furthermore, the Commentaries are much easier to change 
than the Model Treaty itself because disenting countries can and do register reserva-
tions to the Commentaries on particular articles of the Model Treaty. 
21 The OECD does not intend for the Commentary to have a such limited role. In addition, 
the characterization of the Commentaries as a "preparatory work" in the light of Art. 32 
VCLT does not make any sense because of many reasons which have been already in-
dicated by Vogel and other international tax authors. Vogel, Conventions, at 44. 
22 See, for example: RRTEAC of 30 April 1996, 6 November 1996 and 9 April 1997. 
23 DOT used the OECD "Thin Capitalisation" report in order to interpret tax treaty provi-
sions in RRDOT of 17 October 1994. Furthermore, there have been cases where a 
domestic law has not been applied as the tax authorities interpret on the basis of the 
OECD Model and Commentaries. For instance, in RDOT of 23 December 1983 the 
DOT determined the taxable base of a permanent establishment in accordance with the 
Commentaries to Art. 7 (2) OECD Model, without applying the Spanish Royal Decree. 
24 RRTEAC of 29 August 1993 and 30 April 1996. 
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domestic tax legislation as well (such as transfer pricing rules) which have 
nothing to do with tax treaties.25 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the OECD Commentary is not bind-
ing - as the OECD Committee itself declared in the Model's Introduction -
in the interpretation of tax treaties.26 Notwithstanding, as the network of tax 
conventions increases, the relevance of the Commentary as a generally accept-
ed guide becomes greater. 
V. The relevance of Art. 3 (2) OECD Model 
Obviously, it is rather important that tax treaties are interpreted the same way 
in both countries (the principle of common interpretation) because otherwise 
income may be taxed twice or not at all. For that reason, tax agreements based 
on the OECD Model Treaty, such as the treaties concluded by Spain, contain -
in addition to the provisions of the VCLT - an internal rule of interpretation. 
Art. 3 (2) of the OECD Model provides that undefined terms used in the treaty 
have the meaning they have under the domestic law of the country applying 
the treaty, unless the context requires otherwise. Therefore, the application of 
the aforesaid article involves a three-stage process: firstly, it should be deter-
mined whether or not the treaty itself provides a definition of the term; if a 
definition is not provided, the domestic meaning of the term must be adopted, 
unless the treaty context requires a different meaning . 
As the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs stated,27 the context is determined 
in particular by the intention of the contracting States when signing the conven-
tion as well as the meaning given to the term in question in the legislation of 
the other contracting State (an implicit reference to the principle of reciprocity 
on which the Convention is based). Basically, not only Spanish tax treaties 
follow the rule established by Art. 3 (2) OECD Model but also Spanish tax 
authorities and courts28 observe the requirements of this Article. 29 
In case reference is made to the Spanish domestic legislation - only possible in 
the absence of a treaty -, the meaning of the term undefined ,may be ascertained 
25 Calder6n Carrero/Pifia Garrido, ET 1999, p 385; see, for instance RRTEAC of 
23 March 1988 and 18 July 1990. 
26 As Vogel noted, its binding nature would not yet be justified either under International 
law or under the constitutional law of most member countries. Vogel, Tax Treaty news, 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2000, p 98. 
27 Paragraph 12 of the OECD Commentaries to Art. 3 (2). 
28 See RDGT of 13 January 1995; RTEAC 29 August 1993; SAN 12 December 1995. 
29 An exception to this general rule is the Spanish tendency to apply a "static interpretation" 
of the term in question- particularly when a contracting State has changed the domestic 
meaning of a term and this amendment alters the taxing powers agreed by both contract-
ing States- rather than the "dynamic interpretation" recommended by the OECD. See 
RTEAC of 11 June 1997. 
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by reference to the meaning it has for the purpose of any relevant provision 
of the domestic law"30 of Spain whether or not a tax law. However, as the 
OECD Committee adds, ,where a term is defined differently for the purposes of 
different laws of a contracting State, the meaning given to that term for pur-
poses of the laws imposing the taxes to which the Convention applies shall 
prevail over all others, including those given for the purposes of other tax laws". 
Finally, as far as the Spanish treaty practice is concerned, reference made by 
Art. 3 (2) OECD Model to domestic legislation does not extend to "concepts" 
but only to "terms" used in this kind of conventions. 
VI. The relevance of other references to domestic law contained 
in bilateral tax treaties 
In terms of its wording, paragraph 1 of Art. 4 OECD Model makes an explicit 
reference to the domestic legislation of the contracting State in order to deter-
mine whether a person fulfils the conditions required in order to be a resident 
of that State. The purport of this provision is to avoid the possibility of an indi-
vidual or legal person to be considered a resident in the two contracting States. 
From our point of view, this objective has been reached particularly by the 
Commentaries to this Article, which preclude the problem of a conflict of resid-
ence in the scope of double tax treaties.31 
Moreover, we can easily find some explicit references to domestic law con-
tained in the following provisions of the OECD Model: Art. 6 (2) expressly 
refers to the internal law of the contracting State in which the propetty is situ-
ated in order to determine the meaning of the term "immovable property" for 
treaty interpretation purposes. Notwithstanding, on the one hand the provi-
sion specifies certain things that must be always included in this expression 
and, on the other hand, some others that shall not be regarded as "immovable 
property". In line with it, another reference of this kind is located in Art. 10 (3) 
which, after having defined the term "dividends" for its right understanding in 
the treaty context, also includes ,income from other corporate rights" which 
have the same taxation treatment as income from shares by the domestic legis-
lation of the State of which the company that makes the distribution is a resident. 
A few steps further back in time, the wording of Art. 11 (3) in the 1963 OECD 
Draft Convention32 provided another good example of reference to the internal 
30 Paragraph 13.1 of the OECD Commentaries to Art. 3 (2). 
31 See Garcfa Prats, Triangular cases and residence as a basis for alleviating international 
double taxation. Rethinking the subjective scope of double tax treaties, Intertax 1994, 
p482. 
32 In the 1963 OECD Draft Convention, Art. 11 (3) read as follows: "3. The term "interest" 
as used in this Article means income from government securities, bonds or debentures, 
whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate 
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law, by stating that this expression encompasses, apart from the incomes 
expressly referred, other kinds of income that the State in which the income 
arises assimilates to income from money lent in its taxation law. 
To sum up, we can conclude that whereas in the first and the third cases refer-
ence is made to the internal legislation of the State of source, in the second 
situation, however, the criteria adopted point to the State in which the company 
distributing the dividends has its residence. This implies, in our opinion, that 
the establishment of a general rule on this issue does not make sense at all. It 
seems to be more convenient to refer to the domestic law of the State of source 
or the State of residence, depending on each particular situation and kind of 
income.33 
Further, we consider that no reference is made in Art. 23 OECD Model to 
any domestic legislation in terms of treaty interpretation. The qualification 
mentioned by this provision is not made by the State of source but by the 
treaty rules agreed upon by both contracting States. Therefore, whether accord-
ing to these settlements - that are binding for the two parties - the State of source 
is entitled to tax income or properties of a resident of the other contracting 
State, this one must provide in its internal tax law some methods to avoid an 
international double taxation situation. The unique aim of the reference to do-
mestic law of the State of reference made by Art. 23 is to oblige this State to 
prevent its residents from double taxation that will probably derive from 
situations in which, as both parties agreed, the right to tax corresponds to the 
State of source although the person liable to be taxed is not a resident of this 
State. In this respect, the discussion on this issue maintained in international 
literature has been definitively solved by Paragraphs 32.3 and 32.5 of the 
Commentaries to Art. 23 OECD MC.34 
in profits, and debt-claims of every kind as well as all other income assimilated to in-
come from money lent by the taxation law of the State in which the income arises". 
33 In our view, another allusion to domestic law is included in Art. 12 (4), when refer-
ring to the internal taxation treatment of both contracting States in the specific case 
concerning royalties set out in this provision. 
34 From the point of view of A very Jones, ,the question of categorisation of income ap-
plies only to the source State and that State's determination of the question of how the 
income is to be taxed is conclusive against the residence State, ( ... ). ( ... ), the source 
State's categorisation( ... ) would bind the residence State to exempting it or giving full 
credit ( ... )". A very Jones et a!, The interpretation of tax treaties with particular refer-
ence to article 3 (2) of the OECD Model", British Tax Review 1984, pp 50 et seq. 
Against A very Jones' opinion- UK national reporter in the IFA Congress 1993-, never-
theless, ,the General Reporters (Vogel and Prokisch) think that the residence State, 
when exempting income from taxation or granting a credit, may and will verify that the 
source State reaches a different conclusion, it will deny the tax exemption or allowance". 
Vogel/Prokisch, General report (471h Congress of the International Fiscal Association, 
Florence, 1993), in: Cahiers de Droit Fiscallntemational volume LXXV/lla, p 79. 
Paragraph 32.3 of the Commentaries to Art. 23 OECD MC states that ,where, due to 
differences in the domestic law between the State of source and the State of residence, 
the former applies, with respect to a particular item of income or capital, provisions of 
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In any event and going back to the question of a "static" versus a "dynamic" 
meaning, we agree with the authors in considering the ambulatory interpretation 
the best solution even though it is important not to lose sight of the significant 
problem that the aforesaid approach involves, as it permits a country to amend 
its tax treaties unilaterally depending on the nature of the amendment.35 
VII. The relevance of mutual agreements 
Although the mutual agreement procedure clause is generally included in the 
tax treaties signed by Spain, this mechanism has rarely been used for the pur-
pose of determining the meaning of a tax treaty term. In our opinion, a signi-
ficant element is the absence of any provision requiring the competent author-
ities to reach an agreement or providing an alternative dispute resolution proced-
ure in case the one established in Art. 25 (3) OECD Model fails to achieve 
that objective. 
As the OECD Committee put it, the result of this procedure resolving general 
difficulties of interpretation or application of the convention is "binding on 
administrations as long as the competent authorities do not agree to modify 
or rescind the mutual agreement".36 This means that both contracting States 
will be bound by the solution agreed through this procedure. In fact, there does 
not exist an appeal in Spain against results of the mutual agreement procedure. 
As far as the status of these agreements in the VCLT is concerned, we do not 
see any obstacle - despite the silence of the Spanish tax commentators - to 
consider them "subsequent agreements" in accordance with Art. 31 (3) (a) of 
the VCLT. 
the Convention that are different from those that the State of residence would have ap-
plied to the same item of income or capital, the income is still being taxed in accord-
ance to the provisions of the Convention, as interpretaed and applied by the State 
of source. In such a case, therefore, the two articles require that relief from 
double taxation be granted by the State of residence notwithstanding the conflict 
of qualification resulting from these differences in domestic law". Moreover, Para-
graph 32.5 of the Commentaries provides that ,Art. 23 A and Art. 23 B, however, do 
not require that the State of residence eliminate double taxation in all cases where the 
State of source has imposed its tax by applying to an item of income a provision of the 
Convention that is different from that which the State of residence considers to be appli-
cable. ( ... ) Such conflicts resulting from different interpretation of facts or different 
interpretation of the provisions of the Convention must be distinguished from the con-
flicts of qualification described in the above paragraph where the divergence is based 
not on different interpretations of the provisions of the Convention but on different 
provisions of domestic law". 
35 For instance, whether a contracting State modifies its domestic law in a way that substan-
tially alters the agreement between the two contracting States, and that was not contemplat-
ed by both of them, that amendment is equivalent to a treaty override. 
36 Paragraph 36 of the OECD Commentaries to Art. 25. 
315 
VIII. The relevance of the other contracting State's tax 
authority practice 
At first sight, Spanish tax treaty interpretation does not usually take into consid-
eration the other State's tax authority practice on this topic. The unilateral 
practice followed by the other contracting State is not binding either, because 
only a uniform understanding of the treaty term concerned could be binding 
on both of the contracting States on the basis of Art. 31 (3) (b) of the VCLT. 
Nevertheless, in relation with the so-called "subsequent practice", it is very 
important to note - in contrast to other subjects (for example, Law of the 
Sea) -, that on the content of tax treaties concluded by Spain the relevance of 
that general practice followed by the parties after having signed the convention 
is practically non-existent. For that reason, it would be really difficult that 
this "subsequent agreement" could modify any tax treaty provision. 
IX. The relevance of foreign court decisions 
Not only Spanish tax courts but also Spanish tax authors carefully study foreign 
court decisions regarding treaty interpretation. Although these decisions are 
not binding on tax authorities in Spain, they become very useful guidance of how 
other countries understand the same provision and provide examples both to 
the scholars and courts in order to harmonize as much as possible the tax 
treaty interpretation criteria. 
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